I have argued previously in;
Do We Need a 2005 Defence White Paper
, that we need an updated Defence White Paper, and that the supporting documents released since do not fully answer some changes in the strategic environment regionally and domestically. As a result I was interested to see the Howard Government's reply to the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade recommendations.
This is the recommendations on defence in the Senate Hansard;
Recommendation 2: The committee recommends that the Defence Minister develop a new Defence White Paper for issue during 2005-06. From the introduction of this White Paper, a new Defence White Paper should be developed every four years through a rolling four year program. The proposed new White Paper should re-emphasise the point that Australia's defence policy is ultimately defensive. The committee would envisage that `power projection ashore' would relate to instances where Australian forces, as part of coalitions, have been requested to assist with the affairs in other nations. The Government, in developing the new White Paper, should take into account the conclusions made by the committee including:Those are sensible recommendations in my opinion and serious questions that need well articulated answers that a white paper would produce. The Government's response was;
- Australia's strategic objectives be the defence of Australia and its direct approaches together with greater focus on, and acquisition of, capabilities to operate in the region and globally in defence of our non-territorial interests;
- clear articulation of why Australia's security is interrelated with regional and global security;
- the continuation of the commitment to `self-reliance' in those situations where Australia has least discretion to act;
- focusing on measures that will enhance interoperability with Australia's allies such as the US; and
- developing and implementing a maritime strategy which includes the elements of sea denial, sea control and power projection ashore. (paragraph 4.124)
Government Response: On releasing Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force, the Government undertook to review our defence posture periodically to ensure Australia continues to have the appropriate mix of concepts, capabilities and forces to meet any changes to the strategic environment. In response to the attacks of September 2001 and October 2002, a review of Defence strategy, in the form of Australia's National Security: A Defence Update 2003 was undertaken. This review, and the subsequent one undertaken in 2005, confirmed that the principles set out in the 2000 White Paper remain sound. Defence 2000, the Defence Update 2003, and the Defence Update 2005 include the Government's position on the issues raised in the committee's recommendation. The Government does not agree with the recommendation that White Papers be developed every four years. The Government will continue to implement Defence 2000 and will maintain an up-to-date strategic assessment to inform changes in our capability priorities, defence planning and wider national security requirements. It will, from time to time, continue to provide public updates of its strategic assessment of our security environment and the policy priorities that flow from this.There is a lack of a defining doctrine or philosophy in Australian defence and it shows in the confused procurement that has gone on recently. There needs to be clarity of vision in this area as political decisions can have structural and operational repercussions in the ADF for the next quarter of a century. The Committee also recommended more force multipliers in the form of Air to Air refuelling assets;
Recommendation 5 The committee recommends that the Department of Defence review the number of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft that it will need to mount effective operations. The committee is of the view that Defence may require more AARs than has currently been planned. (paragraph 5.72) Government Response: The Government does not agree that further review of the number of air-to-air refuelling (AAR) aircraft required to mount effective operations is required, as detailed analysis was completed as part of the process to acquire the AAR aircraft. The number of AAR aircraft being acquired has been determined based on assessment of what would be needed to support credible contingencies.AAR assets are constantly in short supply when the ADF is on international and coalition deployments. Relying on the US to make up for our lack of the force multipliers is a mistake. The US uses all theirs to an absolute maximum as well. If Australia procures JSFs, the AAR assets will become doubly important as the JSF cannot operate over a wide area independently. Air to air refuelling assets will become essential for Australian force projection.
